Guide to the Study of Intelligence

Sweden’s Intelligence Services

by Michael Fredholm

For much of the twentieth century, Sweden has adhered to a policy of neutrality. It declined to participate in either of the world wars and avoided being a target of any of the belligerent powers. Its intelligence and security services played a major role supporting Sweden’s foreign policy in both the First and particularly the Second World War. However, since details of these successes remained highly classified throughout the subsequent Cold War, this fact was little appreciated by later governments, which may have concluded that righteousness, not effective use of intelligence, had kept Sweden safe.

It was not by pure chance that Sweden’s intelligence system functioned well during the world wars. Although Sweden opted out of foreign adventures after the Napoleonic wars, its armed forces possessed an intelligence tradition no less rich than those of the great European powers of long standing. Sweden’s intelligence services operate today in an environment largely formed during the Second World War, but which originated far earlier.

Origins of the Swedish Intelligence System

An intelligence system existed very early in Sweden, although it was neither well organized nor formalized. In the late Viking Age, the Swedish King appointed bailiffs in the border regions. One of them, Eilif, among other duties, was responsible for keeping an eye on developments on the Norwegian side of the border. In c. 1017, Norway’s King Olaf moved with his army towards the border. Eilif sent out spies to monitor the Norwegian activities. However, King Olaf had already sent men to infiltrate Eilif’s retinue, and these agents had Eilif assassinated.

While there existed a foreign intelligence system, there was no security service, at least not until one was established in 1560 by Jöran Persson, the secretary and prosecutor for the mentally unstable King Erik XIV. Jöran Persson’s mission was to track down rivals among the nobility. In a ruthless and often deceitful manner, he produced a large number of death sentences, until eventually he himself was sentenced and executed by his own court. Jöran Persson’s security organization was limited to a purely domestic role; the King controlled his own agents abroad. A preserved document from 1566-1567 lists the names of agents, in neighboring countries and as far away as at the courts of France, England, Spain, and several German states including the Imperial capital of Vienna. The King also ran agents in Poland, Russia, and in what had been the Kazan Khanate on the Volga.1

1 A successor state of the Mongol Golden Horde located near the confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers in present central Russia, west of the Urals, it was conquered by Russia in 1552.
The Swedish intelligence system developed substantially during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). A military engineering corps was established in 1613. Its responsibilities included producing reliable maps in all theaters of operations. In the field army, tactical intelligence was gathered by select cavalry patrols. Meanwhile, a system of strategic intelligence was introduced. Swedish officers responsible for intelligence collection, referred to as “residents,” were positioned in major European cities and were augmented by “correspondents” elsewhere throughout Europe, who sent intelligence reports back to Sweden. Correspondents were recruited in Vienna and the German states but also in the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, and Italy. Ciphers of various kinds were used to maintain security of communications, and records suggest (but do not prove) that the Swedes also broke foreign cipher systems.

Surviving documents show that sound principles of intelligence work were already understood, including those of intelligence planning and verification. When Johan Salvius was appointed the new resident in Hamburg, Lars Grubbe, who then ran the intelligence system, was dissatisfied at first with his reports. Grubbe accordingly directed the new resident to report more frequently on specifically Danish activities. In addition, Grubbe emphasized the need also to report the source of the information. “Distinguish between such intelligence which seems reliable and such information the correctness of which cannot be verified,” he instructed the newly appointed resident. In a similar manner, within the field army, cavalry patrols were regularly dispatched to verify the information in tactical intelligence reports.

Military mapping became the responsibility of the Fortification Office, and in 1673, a fortification officer was sent with a diplomatic mission to Moscow. On the way, he produced a manual on Russian fortifications, garrisons, artillery, and military organization, including details on the individual colonels, uniforms, and standards of each regiment. He also mapped and described the roads and waterways en route to Moscow.

In 1715, the Swedish diplomatic representative in London, Count Carl Gyllenborg, organized an intelligence network in the city and English ports to provide forewarning of Russia-bound ships, which carried strategic products and volunteers for the Russian army. The intelligence reports were dispatched via small ships that would rendezvous with Swedish warships in the North Sea. Gyllenborg was arrested by the British in 1717.

Although Sweden’s power and international standing eventually declined, military mapping remained an important task. In 1805, the Field Survey Corps was established for this purpose. In 1873, a Department of Military Statistics was created within the General Staff to process and analyze military attaché reports and published information. Around 1900, code breaking was the responsibility of Room 100 within the General Staff, headed by R. Torpadie, who previously had studied the cryptographic systems of the Thirty Years War. The Navy formed its own integral intelligence department, and in 1901, within a year of the first Swedish naval experiments in radiotelegraphy, it began to take an interest in signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Sweden remained at peace after the Napoleonic Wars. Its first national emergency in almost a century came in the Union Crisis of 1905, which resulted in the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway. As a result, that same year Sweden

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established a clandestine Intelligence Bureau (Upplysningsbyrån, UB) within the General Staff tasked with both foreign and domestic intelligence. The was a new departure as counterespionage and the suppression of political crimes traditionally had been the role of the police department in Stockholm.\footnote{A secret police had been established in Stockholm as early as 1776.} Although the Stockholm police continued to be responsible for domestic security, in 1908 the police began to cooperate with the General Staff, particularly in the monitoring of suspicious foreigners.

**The First World War**

Naval SIGINT may have been first to report the outbreak of war and within a week had broken Russian encoded telegrams. At the time, Russian telegraphic communications with the West passed through Stockholm. This was too good an opportunity to ignore. In 1914, Sweden and Germany agreed to cooperate against Russian diplomatic communications. A special section was formed within the General Staff, consisting of Russian-speaking intelligence officers. \textit{They} intercepted Russian telegrams and handed them over to the Germans. In return, they received the broken messages. In time, the Swedes began to engage in code breaking of its own, especially after the wife of the Swedish liaison officer in Germany smuggled particulars of the ciphers back to Sweden hidden in her corset. Among important Russian state telegrams intercepted was one in 1918 that reported the execution of the imperial family. During the war, naval SIGINT focused on the Russian Baltic Fleet, although it also made some efforts against the German Navy.

Even before the outbreak of war, in 1914 it was decided to establish a common security service as the \textit{ad hoc} cooperation between the Stockholm police and the General Staff was regarded as insufficient. A special organization within the General Staff, known as the Police Bureau, consisting primarily of police detectives, was responsible for counterespionage and domestic security until early 1918, when both the Police Bureau and its mission were returned to the Stockholm police.

**Between the Wars**

In 1931 the new Air Force formed its own intelligence unit.\footnote{The military services retained integral intelligence units until as late as 1981.} In 1937, the Defense Staff was formed as a joint services staff with an intelligence section that included both a foreign and a domestic department. Military attachés were subordinated to the intelligence section.

The Navy continued its SIGINT work. With the formation of the Defense Staff, a signals section was established, which was tasked with SIGINT intercepts and traffic analysis. A cryptography section, referred to as Unit IV, was also formed. In 1938, a joint services SIGINT collection unit was set up in the naval base of Karlskrona. It was named the Defense Staff Radio Establishment (Försvarsstabens radioanstalt, FRA).

The Stockholm Police Bureau continued to be responsible for counterespionage, in particular against foreigners, until 1933, when the National Police (Statspolisen) was
established, in a first modest attempt to create a national police force. The
counterespionage mission was then transferred to the new organization.

The Second World War

In 1942, the Defense Staff intelligence section was renamed as Section II but with
little substantive change. Far greater change took place with regard to intelligence
collection. As a result of the 1939 Soviet attack on Finland, a clandestine human
intelligence (HUMINT) unit was established, known as the G Section. The
clandestine organization grew rapidly, hiring a considerable number of civilians. In
1942 it was placed under the head of Section II and renamed the C Bureau (C-byrån).

The most successful intelligence effort was SIGINT within Unit IV. A number of
Soviet ciphers were successfully broken; however, far more important to Swedish
interests was the fact that following the April 1940 German invasions of Norway and
Denmark and the deployment of German troops to Finland, key German telegraphic
communication lines passed through Sweden. While in the First World War, Germany
had benefited from the fact that Russian telegraphic communications passed through
Stockholm this time Germany had to rely on Swedish landlines. And Sweden was not
averse to tapping them. Germany relied on an advanced crypto-machine known as the
Geheimschreiber, which was believed to be secure. However, in a masterful act of
code breaking, Professor Arne Beurling broke the Geheimschreiber system and from
June 1940 until May 1943, the Swedes could read virtually all German military and
diplomatic communications passing through their country. Even the results of
German codebreaking efforts against Soviet ciphers were transmitted by
Geheimschreiber, so copies of German intelligence reports on the Soviet Union could
be read as well. Among valuable intelligence gained by the Swedes was information
on the German plan to attack the Soviet Union in June 1941. This information was
passed to the British through diplomatic channels. Most importantly Sweden learned
that the German troop movements would not result in an attack on Swedish territory,
a keen concern after the invasions of Denmark and Norway.

The large volume of intercepts in 1942 prompted the move of the SIGINT service to a
new location, outside Stockholm. Reconstituted as an independent authority, known
as the National Defense Radio Establishment (Försvarets radioanstalt, FRA), under
the Ministry of Defense it continued to report to the Defense Staff. The new setup
meant changes in the priorities of SIGINT tasking: the primary effort focused on

5 It was first named Gränsbyrån, meaning the border bureau and later renamed G-sektionen.
6 Geheimschreiber translates as “secret writer.” It was a non-morse teleprinter system.
7 The Swedes broke the German teleprinter codes before the British did. The British first broke one of
them, collectively referred to as “Fish,” by hand in January 1942. By early 1943, assisted by an early
computer, called Colossus, the British Government Code and Cipher School at Bletchley Park was
reading Fish materials regularly. However, the most important teleprinter system read by the Swedes,
called “Sturgeon” in Britain, Bletchley Park only broke later and never read regularly. In June 1942 the
Germans learned via a leak that the Swedes had broken its Geheimschreiber code and changed them,
gradually denying the Swedes this source of intelligence. (See the suggested readings, below, or the
earlier but more easily obtainable Lars Ulfving and Frode Weierud, “The Geheimschreiber Secret:
Arne Beurling and the Success of Swedish Signals Intelligence,” at
https://cryptocellar.web.cern.ch/
cryptocellar/pubs/ulfving_weierud_secret.pdf?sa=view
document&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.)
8 The Swedish intelligence corroborated U.S. SIGINT on Japanese diplomatic reporting from Berlin,
thus influencing the British Joint Intelligence Committee assessment that Germany would likely attack
the Soviet Union later in the month.
German traffic. Soviet Navy traffic, important as it was to Swedish security, was a second-priority target. The traffic of the Western Allies was assigned considerably less priority, merely “some monitoring of certain British traffic.”

The tide of war may have played a role in the establishment of the FRA. Sweden had charted a fairly neutral course between the Axis and the Allies. Sweden supported its neighbor Finland against the Soviet Union, so there was little reason to favor the Allies, except to the extent that Germany posed a potential threat to Sweden as well. Such a threat arose with the German invasions of Denmark and Norway in 1940. Sweden suddenly was surrounded by German armies, and the war was not going well for the Allies. In mid 1942, Colonel Count Carl Björnstjerna, of the Defense Staff intelligence section, began to supply the British naval attaché, Captain Henry Denham, with the results of Swedish SIGINT, including information on the German Navy in Norway. Denham had little to offer in return, and the information transfer was presumably not authorized, since later in the year, Björnstjerna was removed from his post. However, by then the Foreign Ministry was advocating an end to intelligence exchanges with Axis military attachés and a new focus on those of the Allied powers.

One could argue that the contacts with British intelligence and the establishment of the FRA as an organization separate from the Defense Staff was an indication that Swedish intelligence professionals and diplomats realized that the tide of war was changing. Within the Defense Staff, some officers were sympathetic to Germany, which was not surprising in light of the long relationship between the two militaries. Perhaps it was believed that a new intelligence organization, largely staffed by civilians, might be more inclined to see the Western Allies as potential partners.

From 1944, the first experiments in electronic intelligence (ELINT) took place with some cooperation with Britain. The Swedes allowed the Royal Air Force to establish a special duty ELINT unit in southern Sweden.

International intelligence cooperation during the war took place with Finland and Germany on one side and Britain and the United States on the other. Swedish intelligence also maintained links with Denmark and Norway and the resistance movements in these countries. SIGINT played a major role in international cooperation. In 1939-1940, the Swedes broke the Soviet air force cipher. Soviet bombers targeting Finland only received encrypted targeting data after take-off. The Swedes intercepted, broke, and forwarded the targeting data in real time to Finland, thus forewarning Finnish air defenses.

In December 1943, the C Bureau began a substantial effort to introduce a HUMINT network into the occupied Baltic states. With the help of Baltic refugees and with radio support from the FRA, the mission was to collect intelligence on conditions under first German, then Soviet occupation. The operation largely failed, with the loss of most or all agents.

In September 1944, the Finnish intelligence service evacuated to Sweden. The motivation was to continue intelligence operations against Soviet targets in the event of a Soviet occupation. The plan to continue operations failed, but some twenty Finns

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10 The Soviet Union occupied the Baltic states in 1940 and incorporated them into the USSR. They were overrun by the German army in 1941 and recaptured by the Soviet Army in 1944.
were given Swedish identities and were employed by the FRA, where many of them remained until retirement.

Already in 1937, the Defense Staff intelligence section proposed the establishment of a new, secret security service. In 1938, the General Security Service (**Allmänna säkerhetsjänsten**) was established, led by District Police Commissioner Eric Hallgren who was subordinated the Minister for Social Affairs and incidentally also had led the old Police Bureau from 1918. The mission to carry out counterespionage and domestic security was transferred from the National Police to the General Security Service, which received a broad mandate including letter censorship and telephone monitoring.\(^{11}\)

**Swedish Intelligence in the Cold War**

Section II of the Defense Staff continued operations after the Second World War as did the SIGINT service, FRA. Changes took place in the clandestine HUMINT C Bureau, reorganized in 1946 as the T Office (**T-kontoret**). Much of the work focused on the Soviet threat. The Polish people’s referendum on 30 June 1946 and parliamentary elections on 19 January 1947 had a particular impact on the Swedish government. The Swedish press trusted the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*, so news reporting presented a rosy picture of the situation. However, SIGINT reporting, based on broken Polish ciphers, confirmed the widespread manipulation of the election results and voter intimidation. The FRA reporting enabled the Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, to assess the real situation in Soviet-controlled Poland and base Sweden’s policies on fact, not newspaper reporting. Erlander noted: “The election methods were exposed with terrible exactness—‘investigate so that they do not hide an opposition ballot up their shirtsleeves.’ So this is the nice election, which even our press has been duped into believing in.”\(^{12}\) The FRA reporting greatly influenced the Swedish government’s understanding of events in Poland and elsewhere in Soviet-held Europe, pushing it further towards the West.

The SIGINT effort was not free from loss of life. On 13 June 1952, the DC-3 Dakota ELINT aircraft, with an FRA crew, was shot down with no survivors, by a Soviet fighter while on a mission over the Baltic Sea.\(^{13}\)

Because of the threat from Soviet agents, Section II of the Defense Staff in 1957 formed a secret counterespionage unit, the B Bureau (**B-byrån**). Technical intelligence organizations were also established which used technical experts from institutions such as the Royal Institute of Technology (**Kungliga tekniska högskolan**, KTH) when, for instance, foreign military materiel had been acquired. In 1945, the Defense

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\(^{11}\) Among those recruited to carry out these tasks was Astrid Lindgren, later a well-known writer of children’s stories such as the Pippi Longstocking books.


\(^{13}\) The Soviets demonstrated a great sensitivity to any foreign intelligence gathering. “…[A]s many as thirteen intelligence gathering American aircraft were shot down around and over the Soviet periphery between 1947 and 1960…” Michael Herman, “Intelligence as Threats and Reassurance,” in Michael Herman & Gwilyn Hughes (Editors), *Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference Did It Make?* (New York: Routledge, 2013): 42.
Research Establishment (Försvarstets forskningsanstalt, FOA) was created. The SUN echo radar unit, formed in 1942, was involved in advanced ELINT efforts in addition to research in radar technology. In 1958, at the initiative of Section II of the Defense Staff, intelligence units were formed in the FOA and the service administrations. The latter were reorganized as the Defense Matériel Administration (Försvarets materielverk, FMV) in 1968 but retained technical intelligence units.

In 1959 the Eastern Economic Bureau (Östekonomiska byrån) was formed with the task to carry out research on the economies of the Soviet bloc. At first a function within the Defense Staff, it was established as a non-state foundation, funded in part from private sources.

The General Security Service was dissolved in 1945, and the National Police resumed responsibility for counterespionage. At the same time, the government severely cut security service funding and staff. It took until the Polish elections in early 1947 before the government fully realized that a cold war had begun. Because of the lack of resources and coordination, Colonel Stig Wennerström, the spy for the Soviets who perhaps caused most damage to Swedish interests, successfully operated from at least 1948 until his arrest in 1963. For years, the police and military did not share their suspicions of him.

In 1965, the Swedish police system was finally put under national control. This led to reorganizations also within the military intelligence organization. The T Office (foreign intelligence) and the B Bureau (counterespionage) were combined, called the IB and subordinated to the head of the Defense Staff. The police were subordinated to a new organization, called the National Police Board (Rikspolisstyrelsen, RPS), which had two departments: the police and the security department. The police department eventually became the National Bureau of Investigation (Rikskriminalpolisen, RKP), tasked primarily with organized and transnational crime. The security department (säkerhetsavdelningen, SÄK) became responsible for counterespionage.

In 1969, new legislation to safeguard the freedom of opinion outlawed government registration of political sympathies. The RPS claimed sole jurisdiction with regard to domestic security. As a result, the domestic intelligence activities of the IB, primarily counterespionage and the registration of political extremists, ceased in 1970.

However, the IB resumed these activities in 1971. This was exposed by the media in 1973, which also exposed for the first time key organizations and personnel in the intelligence community. The IB’s domestic collection ceased, and in 1974 the first public review of the intelligence community was initiated. All foreign intelligence activities were also put under direct government and parliamentary oversight with the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Committee (Försvarets Underrättelsenämnd, FUN).

14 The FOA combined the Defense Chemical Establishment (Försvarsväsendets kemiska anstalt, FKA), the Institute of Military Physics (Militärfysiska institutet, MFI), and a component of the Swedish Board of Inventions (Statens uppfinnarnämnd, SUN).
16 It is interesting to note that the Swedish review of its intelligence community preceded by a year the establishment in the US of congressional committees to investigate intelligence community transgressions revealed by the press.
No longer permitted to engage in domestic intelligence activities, the IB was reorganized in 1973 and renamed the Joint Intelligence Bureau (Gemensamma byrån för underrättelser, GBU). In 1982, the GBU was renamed the Special Collection Section (Sektionen för särskild inhämtning, SSI) and subsequently, in 1989, the Special Collection Office (Kontoret för särskild inhämtning, KSI), the designation which the military clandestine foreign intelligence organization has since retained.

Domestic security and intelligence activities in the late 1960s and 1970s were characterized by considerable rivalry between different organizations and their respective supporters, with the ruling Social Democratic party, the Armed Forces, and various groupings within the police often opposed to each other. Journalists took advantage of the persistent rivalry, and leaks of sensitive information were commonplace. Domestic politics trumped national security issues. From the mid-1960s successive Swedish governments, led by a new generation of political leaders, championed a variety of foreign national liberation movements while promising firm and unshakeable international neutrality. Simultaneously, Swedish governments maintained close (but often secret) links with NATO member states and regarded the Soviet bloc as a common opponent.

In 1981, the Defense Staff reorganized, and Section II became Operations Section 5 (Op 5), which for the first time combined the intelligence units of the services into one, integrated military intelligence service.

Swedish Intelligence from 1989 to the Present

From 1989, further reorganizations of the Defense Staff took place.17 In 1994, intelligence was named the Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetsfjästen, MUST), its current designation. Colloquially known as the security police (Säkerhetspolisen, Säpo), the RPS security department in 1989 attained a more autonomous position, under its own Director-General. Soon afterwards, the RKP (National Bureau of Investigation) developed its own integral intelligence function. The security police focused on counterespionage and domestic security investigations; the RKP, in addition to investigations, grew its intelligence as part of its crime prevention mandate, establishing an analytic intelligence unit to report on trends, causes, and patterns of crime. Focus lay on prospective, intelligence-led policing (unlike investigations, which are retrospective and focus on events that already have occurred). The RKP was also tasked with international police cooperation, including with Europol as a joint intelligence organization for the European Union (EU) member states.

In 2001, a new Defense Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI) was created by combining the Defense Research Establishment (FOA) with the Institute for Aeronautic Research (Flygtekniska försöksanstalten, FFA).

An Intelligence Secretariat (Samordningssekretariatet för säkerhetspolitiska underrättelsefrågor, SUND) was formed in 2000 within the Ministry of Defense to coordinate the intelligence services. This did not change oversight and control. The MUST, FRA, and FOI remained under the control of the Ministry of Defense, while the RPS remained under the control of the Ministry of Justice. Legislation and

17 From 1989 to 1994 Op 5 was the Intelligence and Security Office (Underrättelse- och säkerhetskontoret, Underrättelse- och säkerhetsledningen, USK/USL).
supervision of the intelligence services were enhanced, though. In 2000, new legislation, for the first time, regulated military intelligence activities. Legislation was also introduced to regulate SIGINT activities. The Social Democratic party, which prepared the legislation, lost the parliamentary election before the new proposed law could be put before parliament. Ironically, the party, in opposition, sharply criticized the legislation when the succeeding government introduced it in 2007. This resulted in a vicious political debate, with intelligence often denounced in principle on moral grounds. While the law eventually came into force, it included a range of privacy safeguards and a battery of newly formed oversight institutions. New legislation also followed for the RPS, including further regulation in 2010 to protect the personal data of those suspected of criminal activities.

On 1 January 2015, the police system was again reorganized. The RPS and all police departments were combined into one police authority. All intelligence activities would henceforth be led by a new organization, the National Operations Department (Nationella operativa avdelningen, NOA). At the same time, the security police (Säpo) became an independent authority, under the Ministry of Justice, with the exclusive mission to handle counterespionage and the protection of the national government and the democratic system. For the first time since 1945, and during a period not at risk of war for the first time since 1560, Sweden again had an independent security service.

In retrospect, the years following the end of the Cold War suggest a sense of loss of mission for the Swedish intelligence community. The Soviet threat was gone; what would come in its place? At the same time, Sweden joined the EU, so many in government believed that Sweden no longer needed foreign intelligence. The disappearance of the Soviet threat also led to a widespread feeling that there was little need for armed forces. It followed that there was also little need for military intelligence. The intelligence services increasingly came to be seen as political liabilities, and regulation became far more important than intelligence results. This would perhaps have been understandable had there been any major abuse of intelligence powers. However, none had taken place since the registration of political extremists back in the early 1970s. Perhaps it was simply the rhetoric of righteousness in combination with the lack of obvious foreign threats to national security that persuaded a new generation of political leaders that intelligence was, like war itself, something that ought to be confined to museums.

Readings For Instructors

There are few books in English on the Swedish intelligence services. Notable exceptions are:

While research has been carried out by reputable scholars such as Wilhelm Agrell, Matthew M. Aid, and Cees Wiebes, few papers on the Swedish intelligence services by knowledgeable researchers were ever published in English.

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